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Introduction

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“Tribunal” or “HRTO”) has the power to award damages to
applicants for violations of the Ontario Human Rights Code (“Code”) for the “injury to dignity, feelings and
self-respect” they experience as a result of discrimination.1 Significant concerns have been raised in recent
years that these damages awards, typically referred to by the Tribunal as “general damages”, are generally
too low to properly reflect the importance of equality rights, and thus do not adequately compensate those
who have endured the harm of discrimination. Notably, in his thorough and persuasive study of the impact
of amendments to the Code that came into effect in 2008, Andrew Pinto reported that many stakeholders felt
that general damages were “routinely too low”.2 Following his review of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence Pinto
concluded that “there appears to be a widening gap between the Tribunal’s insistence that human rights
awards should be meaningful, and the actual monetary compensation that is awarded in most instances.”3
As a result, the Pinto Report recommended that the HRTO reconsider its approach to general damages and
significantly increase the monetary range of these awards.4

Pinto’s view is widely shared within the Ontario human rights bar. In surveying 50 Ontario human rights
lawyers in the fall of 2014, Nadia Halum found that 93% of the lawyers who represent applicants agreed
that general damages awards are too low, 91% of the lawyers who represent both applicants and



JD, Class of 2016, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
The authors would like to thank David Baker, Ruth Corbin, Meryl Gary, Yola Grant, Judith Keene, Kathy Laird,
Andrew Pinto and the anonymous reviewers for the Journal of Law and Equality for their helpful comments on an
earlier version of this paper. Any errors that remain are the authors’ sole responsibility.
1
Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 45.2(1)1 [Code].
2
Office of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012 by
Andrew Pinto (Ontario: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, November 2012) at 70 [“Pinto Report”].
3
Ibid at 73.
4
Ibid.
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respondents shared this opinion, and even 36% of lawyers who represent respondents believed that general
damages awards are too low.5

In his report, Pinto did not present data on the size of general damages awards. He did note that, in
November 2012, $5,000, $10,000 and $15,000 were the typical amounts of low, medium and high awards
issued by the Tribunal, and that this range of awards appeared to be similar to the range of awards issued
before the 2008 legislative reforms took effect.6

Against the backdrop of this debate, we present a comprehensive picture of the size of general damages
awards issued by the Tribunal. What amounts has the Tribunal ordered respondents to pay successful
applicants as general damages to compensate for the experience of discrimination? How have these amounts
changed over time? In particular, was Pinto right to observe that the range of awards issued by the Tribunal
had not changed following the 2008 changes to the Code? And in the years since the release of the Pinto
Report in November 2012, has the Tribunal responded to his recommendation that it should reconsider its
approach and significantly increase the size of general damages awards?

To answer these questions, we compiled a database that includes all final decisions of the Tribunal that
made a finding of discrimination from 2000 to 2015. We tabulated all general damages awards made by the
Tribunal in these cases during this period (464 awards in total). Our analysis of the data reveals that the
average size of general damages awards trended upward from 2000 to 2006, then dropped sharply from
2007 to 2009 (the period of transition to the direct access model of adjudication implemented by the 2008
Code amendments). Then, from 2010 to 2015, the average size of general damages awards gradually
increased.

In Part I of this paper, we begin by briefly describing Ontario’s human rights system, and how it has
changed as a result of the 2008 legislative amendments. In Part II, we summarize the conventional approach
to general damages assessment consistently followed by the Tribunal throughout the period under study and
discuss what Pinto and others have had to say about the range of general damages awards issued by the
Tribunal. Part III describes the method we adopted to compile the data on general damages awards. Part IV
constitutes the core of the paper. In that Part, we present the data on the mean, median and range of general

5

Nadia Halum, “The Undignified Value of Dignity in Human Rights Adjudication” (Anti-Discrimination Intensive
Program, Osgoode Hall Law School, December 2014) [unpublished, on file with the authors] at 7-8 [“Halum”].
6
Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 72.
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damages awards from 2000 to 2015. We also adjust the data to take into account the impact of inflation. The
data reveals that, as Pinto observed, the range of the vast majority of general damages awards has remained
relatively unchanged across the legislative reforms, and indeed from 2000 to 2015, with his $5,000, $10,000
and $15,000 low, medium and high benchmarks confirmed as relatively accurate descriptors of this range.
After adjusting for inflation, our data reveals that the range has, in real terms, decreased.

Our data, and our study of the cases in our database, has led us to share Pinto’s view that HRTO general
damages awards are too low to reflect the importance of the equality rights protected by the Code. In Part V,
we consider what steps the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the
Human Rights Legal Support Centre and the legislature might take to ensure that the size of general
damages awards is increased and not steadily eroded due to inflation.

I.

Introduction to Ontario’s human rights system

The Ontario Human Rights Code prohibits discrimination based on a list of enumerated grounds, such as
disability, sex and race, in certain social areas, predominantly employment, housing and services.

For those who have experienced a Code violation, the Code establishes special institutions and procedures
aimed at providing prompt and affordable access to justice. The Code establishes three institutional bodies,
or “pillars”:7 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“Tribunal”), the Ontario Human Rights Commission
(“Commission”), and the Human Rights Legal Support Centre (“Centre”).

The Tribunal is an adjudicative body specifically designed to provide accessible adjudication of individuals’
human rights applications, by Tribunal members with expertise in interpreting and applying the Code.8
Individuals who have experienced discrimination file applications directly with the Tribunal at no cost. The
Tribunal provides applicants with optional mediation services before their applications may proceed to a
hearing. The Tribunal has expansive remedial powers and broad discretion in determining its own
procedure. 9 The Tribunal also has the power to establish rules of procedure that are “alternatives to
7

The Ontario Code is unique in the country for creating a human rights infrastructure with three pillars. Two recent
books provide excellent overviews of the state of human rights institutions in Canada: Shelagh Day, Lucie Lamarche
and Ken Norman eds, 14 Arguments in Favour of Human Rights Institutions (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) (14
Arguments); Pearl Eliadis, Speaking Out on Human Rights: Debating Canada’s Human Rights System
(Kingston/Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014).
8
Code, supra note 1, Part IV.
9
Ibid, s 40.
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traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures”, allowing the Tribunal to assist self-represented
applicants through “active adjudication”. 10 For example, the Tribunal may define or narrow the issues
required to dispose of an application, limit the evidence and submissions of the parties on such issues, and
conduct examinations in chief or cross-examinations of a witness.11

The Centre provides free legal assistance to those who have filed, or are considering filing, human rights
applications with the Tribunal.12 Individuals may receive different levels of legal service provision, from
summary advice by phone up to representation at a hearing, depending on the nature of their issue and the
stage of their application.

The Commission is tasked with a range of responsibilities, including the creation of human rights policies,
undertaking public education initiatives, protecting and promoting human rights through institutional
partnerships and other activities, and instituting and intervening in Tribunal proceedings in the public
interest.13

To understand the operation of Ontario’s human rights system over the period of this study and as it
currently stands, one must be aware of the dramatic impact of amendments to the Code that came into force
in 2008 and which overhauled Ontario’s human rights system in a number of ways, three of which we will
discuss here. First, the amendments established a “direct access model”. Before 2008, the Commission had
responsibility for screening applications and determining which ones it would carry forward to the Tribunal
10

Ibid, s. 43(3)(a). On the trend toward “active adjudication”, see Michelle Flaherty, “Self-represented Litigants,
Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias: Issues in Administrative Law” (2015) 38 Dalhousie LJ 119; Lorne
Sossin and Samantha Green, “Administrative Justice and Innovation: Beyond the Adversarial/Inquisitorial
Dichotomy” in Sasha Baglay, Laverne Jacobs, eds., The Nature Of Inquisitorial Processes In Administrative Regimes:
Global Perspectives, Routledge, 2013.
11
Ibid, s. 43(3)(b)(i), 43(3)(c).
12
Ibid, Part IV.1. For background and discussion of the adoption of the direct access model in Ontario, see Mary
Cornish, Fay Faraday and Jo-Anne Pickel, Enforcing Human Rights in Ontario (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book,
2009); Le Tribunal des droits de la personne & Barreau du Québec ed., L’accès direct à un tribunal spécialisé en
matière de droit à l’égalité: l’urgence d’agir au Québec? / Access to a Specialized Human Rights tribunal: An Urgent
need to act in Quebec? (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008) (especially the contributions by Juliet S. Robin,
“Modernising Ontario’s Human Rights System: The Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006”, at 321, Michael
Gottheil and Kathy Laird, “Direct Access to a Specialized Human Rights Tribunal: The Ontario Experience”, at 145,
and Pearl Eliadis, “Human Rights Tribunals and Direct Access to Adjudication: A New Generation of Human Rights
Protection?” at 205); J. Manuel Mendelzon, “Rights, Remedies and Rhetoric: On a Direct Access Model for Human
Rights Complaints in Ontario”, (2008-09) 6 J.L. & Equality 51; Tiffany Tsun, “Overhauling the Ontario Human
Rights System: Recent Developments in Case Law and Legislative Reform”, (2009) 67 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 115;
Michelle Flaherty, “Ontario and the Direct Access Model to Human Rights”, in 14 Arguments, supra note 7, at 169 .
13
Code, supra note 1, Part III. See Shaheen Azmi, “Ontario Human Rights Commission Promotion Activities: The
Experience of Responding to Racial Profiling by Police”, in 14 Arguments, supra note 7, at 305.

4

in the public interest. Dissatisfaction with the Commission’s gatekeeper role and chronic delays in the
processing of applications led the Ontario legislature to adopt a direct access model, hoping to provide
applicants with more autonomy over their cases and speedier access to remedies.14 As a result of the 2008
reforms, all applications are now filed directly with the Tribunal and all applicants whose claims fall within
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction have a right to an oral hearing.15

Second, the 2008 amendments established the Human Rights Legal Support Centre in order to provide
applicants with legal assistance. After 2008, applicants had responsibility over their own applications but no
longer benefitted from the legal assistance previously provided by the Commission. The Centre was
established to meet applicants’ need for legal advice and support.
Third, the amendments strengthened the Tribunal in a number of ways: they ensured its expertise, 16
expanded its control over its procedures,17 abolished appeals from its rulings, put in place a strong privative
clause aimed at minimizing interference with Tribunal rulings by courts on judicial review,18 and expanded
its remedial powers.19

At the Tribunal, individuals can seek a wide range of remedies for their human rights violations, all of
which are remedial in nature, not punitive. Individuals may receive the following remedies to compensate
for loss caused by discrimination: general damages, which compensate for the “injury to dignity, feelings
and self-respect” caused by discrimination;20 special damages, which compensate for directly quantifiable
losses, such as lost wages; and non-monetary remedies, such as a reinstatement following a discriminatory
termination. The Tribunal may also order a prospective remedy; that is, a remedy not aimed at
compensating for loss, but rather at promoting future compliance with the Code. 21 These are often referred
to as public interest remedies. For example, the Tribunal may order that the respondent complete human
rights training.

14

Bill 107, Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c.30.
Code, supra note 1, s.34(1) and s.43(2)1.
16
Ibid, s.32(3).
17
Ibid, ss.39-45.1.
18
Ibid, s.45.8.
19
Ibid, s.45.2.
20
Ibid, s.45.2(1)1.
21
Ibid, s.45.2(1)3.
15
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The 2008 legislative amendments altered the Tribunal’s general damages power in the following manner.
Prior to the 2008 amendments, the Tribunal awarded general damages under two heads. The first was
pursuant to the Tribunal’s power to award “monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the
infringement”. 22 The Tribunal and the courts interpreted this as including intangible loss. 23 Second, the
Tribunal could award damages for “mental anguish” up to a maximum of $10,000 if “the infringement ha[d]
been engaged in wilfully or recklessly”.24 The Tribunal routinely evaded the $10,000 cap on damages for
mental anguish by awarding additional damages for non-pecuniary loss pursuant to the open-ended
monetary compensation provision, which had no willful or reckless behaviour requirement and was
uncapped.

The 2008 legislative changes explicitly affirmed the Tribunal’s general damages-granting power, and did
not subject it to a cap. Section 45.2(1)1 of the Code now empowers the Tribunal to award “monetary
compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including
compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.” In addition, the Tribunal’s “mental anguish”
award-granting power was removed. Many viewed these changes as a legislative encouragement of
increased general damages awards, given that the Tribunal’s power to award monetary damages for
intangible loss was explicitly affirmed and left uncapped.

When the Tribunal finds that the applicant has established a violation of the Code’s prohibitions on
discrimination, applicants often receive an award of both special damages and general damages where both
types of loss are established by the evidence. However, the Tribunal did not order an award of special
damages to successful applicants in 256 of the 464 cases in our database (55%). Moreover, the Tribunal did
not make a future compliance order or any other non-monetary order in 220 of the cases in our database
(47%). General damages were the only damages awarded to successful applicants over half of the time, and
were the only remedy received by successful applicants in a quarter of cases (116 of 464).

We will now turn to a discussion of the approach the Tribunal takes to the assessment of general damages.

II: The conventional approach to general damages assessment

22

Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s 41(1)(b) (past version: in force between 20 Aug 2007 and 29 Jun 2008).
Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Shelter Corp, 103 ACWS (3d) 324, [2001] OJ No 297 at para 43 (Div Ct).
24
Code, supra note 23, s. 41(1)(b). For a thorough discussion of how the Tribunal and courts approached these
remedial powers, see ADGA Group Consultants v. Lane, 2008 CanLII 39605 (Ontario SCJ) (Lane) at paras 130-162.
23
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General damages compensate for the injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect caused by discrimination. In
describing this injury, the Tribunal has noted:
The harm […] of being discriminatorily denied a service, an employment opportunity, or
housing is not just the lost service, job or home but the harm of being treated with less
dignity, as less worthy of concern and respect because of personal characteristics, and the
consequent psychological effects.25
How does the Tribunal determine the appropriate amount of general damages to compensate individuals for
this injury? Throughout the time period we studied – 2000 to 2015 – the Tribunal has assessed the
appropriate general damages award in a particular case by “mak[ing] a general evaluation of the
circumstances of the Code violation and its effects”.26 The Tribunal conducts this “general evaluation” by
focusing on two criteria: the objective seriousness of the discriminatory conduct, and the effect of the
conduct on the applicant.27 The first criterion recognizes that an injury to dignity will be more serious for
Code-infringing conduct that is objectively more severe. For example, a discriminatory termination will
generally yield a higher award of general damages award than a single discriminatory comment, because the
former breach is generally understood to cause a more serious injury to dignity. The second criterion –
effect on the applicant – recognizes that an injury to dignity may differ between two applicants who
experience the same objective conduct if their particular circumstances or vulnerability differ. Factors the
Tribunal will consider in determining the effect of the discrimination on the applicant are: “humiliation; hurt
feelings; the loss of self-respect, dignity and confidence by the complainant; the experience of
victimization; the vulnerability of the complainant; and the seriousness of the offensive treatment”.28

After undertaking an assessment of these two criteria, the Tribunal will make an award that is similar to
awards previously issued in cases with similar facts.29 This is what we call the Tribunal’s “conventional”
approach to general damages assessment. The Tribunal does this by canvassing the awards made in previous
cases with similar facts, although this canvassing is not always explicitly discussed in the cases. The
rationale for applying a conventional approach is connected to the inherent difficulty in measuring injuries
to dignity and the desirability of some consistency and thus predictability in general damages assessments.
As the Tribunal explained in Arunachalam v Best Buy Canada:
25

Arunachalam v. Best Buy, 2010 HRTO 1880 at para 45 [Best Buy].
Ibid at para 45. A similar approach was taken prior to 2008: see Lane, supra note 25 at paras 130-162. For an
example of how the Tribunal applied the conventional approach to general damages assessment before the 2008
legislative changes took effect, see Pridham v En-Plas Inc, 2007 HRTO 8 at paras 47-62.
27
Best Buy, supra note 26 at para 52.
28
Lane, supra note 25 at para 154.
29
For a fuller articulation of the Tribunal’s post-2008 approach to general damages assessment, see Best Buy, supra
note 26 at paras 44-55.
26
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Cases with equivalent facts should lead to an equivalent range of compensation,
recognizing, of course, that each set of circumstances is unique. Uniform principles must
be applied to determine which types of cases are more or less serious. Of course there
will always be an element of subjective evaluation in translating circumstances to dollars,
but the Tribunal has a responsibility to the community and parties appearing before it to
ensure that the range of damages based on given facts is predictable and principled. 30
The conventional approach is based on a review of the nominal value of awards awarded by the Tribunal in
the past. Since the real value of past awards is diminished over time by the impact of inflation, consistent
treatment of similar cases over time requires that the nominal value of past awards be adjusted for inflation.
The Tribunal has noted on a number of occasions that it “should be attentive to the possibility of ongoing
inflation of [general] damage awards for non-pecuniary losses that was recognized [by the Supreme Court
of Canada] in the tort context in [Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd] … in the 1970s”. 31 Vice-Chair
Judith Keene emphasized repeatedly in her rulings that the Supreme Court “has taken steps to avoid the
erosion of the quantum of compensatory awards for intangible loss by ensuring that the original ‘cap’ on
such awards should be indexed to inflation.”32 As a result of the courts’ taking into account the impact of
inflation, the cap on non-pecuniary damages in common law tort actions has risen from $100,000, the
original amount imposed by the Supreme Court in Andrews in 1978,33 to $350,000 in recent decisions.34
Despite these repeated acknowledgements by the Tribunal that its conventional approach must similarly
take inflation into account to avoid the erosion of the real value of awards, no Tribunal ruling to date has
explicitly factored inflation into general damages assessment.

While the dominance of the Tribunal’s non-indexed conventional approach to general damages assessment
is evident from a review of the case law, the scholarly literature tells us little about the size of general
damages awards or how they have changed over time. The most useful source is the Pinto Report. As
mentioned above, in November 2012, as part of the statutorily mandated three-year review of the impact of
the 2008 legislative reforms to Ontario’s human rights system, Andrew Pinto reviewed Tribunal
jurisprudence on general damages. He found that, in the time period following the system change on June
30

Best Buy, supra note 26 at para 51.
Ibid at para 49. This passage was quoted by the Tribunal in Lastella v. Oakville Hydro Corporation, 2011 HRTO
1071 at para 19; Piechocinski v. Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No 1519, 2011 HRTO 1430 at para 20;
and Purres v. London Athletic Club (South) Inc, 2012 HRTO 1758 at para 41.
32
McDonald v. Mid-Huron Roofing, 2009 HRTO 1306 at para 54; Direk v. Coffee Time Donuts, 2009 HRTO 1887 at
para 90; Dixon v. 930187 Ontario, 2010 HRTO 256 at para 64; Nemati v. Women’s Support Network of York Region,
2010 HRTO 327 at para 122; Vetricek v. 642518 Canada Inc., 2010 HRTO 757 at para 75; McLean v. DY 4 Systems,
2010 HRTO 1107 at para 104; MK v. […] Ontario Inc, 2011 HRTO 705 at para 44.
33
Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd, [1978] 2 SCR 229 at 265, 83 DLR (3d) 452 (Andrews).
34
See, e.g., Sorochan v. Bouchier, 2015 ABCA 212 at para 22.
31
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30, 2008 up to November 2012, the Tribunal was “typically” granting awards “in the range of $500 to
$15,000”. Pinto found that higher awards of $25,000 to $40,000 were awarded “exceptional[ly]… in serious
cases involving sex discrimination, termination of employment, and/or multiple intersecting grounds of
discrimination”. 35 While there was a widely-held expectation that the range of general damages would
increase following the 2008 legislative changes, Pinto concluded that the range of damages awarded by the
Tribunal had not increased as anticipated, and “but for a few exceptional cases, the monetary awards for
successful applicants [were] not fundamentally different than before Bill 107”.36

As a result of his findings, Pinto agreed with many stakeholders in concluding that general damages awards
were “routinely too low” to adequately compensate applicants for the injury to dignity caused by
discrimination.37 As a result, he advocated their increase: “In order for Tribunal awards to be meaningful, I
recommend that the Tribunal significantly increase the range of damages that are awarded to successful
applicants”.38

In the years following the release of the Pinto Report, some commentators suggested that general damages
were increasing. In their 2014 guide to the Ontario Human Rights Code, Knight, McNaught and Hudson
commented that general damages had in fact increased as a result of the 2008 legislative changes to the
Tribunal’s general damages-granting power, although their method of determining this was not described.39
Others suggested that general damages were increasing as a result of the release of the Pinto Report. For
example, Canadian Lawyer magazine noted:
Maureen Quinlan, an associate with Hicks Morley, pointed to the 2012 Pinto Report as
one factor that has led to increased awards to plaintiffs in human rights cases… “We have
seen that come to fruition,” said Quinlan. “Numbers now range up to the $80,000 range.
The numbers have steadily increased from case to case. Each case tops the previous one.40
35

Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 72.
Ibid.
37
Ibid at 73.
38
Ibid.
39
Jamie Knight, Melanie McNaught & Deborah J Hudson, Ontario Human Rights Code: Quick Reference, 2014 ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 103 (“[t]he removal of the $10,000 cap applicable to damages for mental anguish under
the former Code has resulted in increased compensation awards for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect”) [2014
Quick Reference].
40
Jennifer Brown, “The rise of ‘HR malpractice’ insurance”, Canadian Lawyer InHouse (March 2 2015) online:
Canadian Lawyer <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com>. We note that Brown’s reference to damage awards in the
$80,000 range must be in reference to the size of awards in some cases for special and general damages cumulatively.
See also Ranjan K. Agarwal, “Human Rights Damages on the Rise?”, Bennett Jones Thought Network (20 February
2014), online: Bennett Jones Thought Network <http://blog.bennettjones.com> (“Andrew Pinto recommended that
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario ‘reconsider its current approach to general damages awards in cases where
discrimination is proven. The monetary range of these awards should be significantly increased.’ ... The Tribunal may
36
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In contrast, Dijana Simonovic, former counsel at the Human Rights Legal Support Centre, concluded from
reviewing all awards issued from May 2012 to May 2014 that awards continued to fall within the range
described by Pinto.41

The debate around this issue can be approached with more clarity if more is known about the amounts
successful applicants actually receive in general damages. Thus, we undertook to provide this clarity by
collecting every award issued by the HRTO from 2000 to 2015, analyzing the resulting data, and describing
the results in this paper. Greater certainty about the amounts successful applicants receive in general
damages should provide a better grounding from which debates about the appropriate amount of general
damages may proceed constructively.

III.

Methodology

Using the HRTO database on CanLII, we compiled a list of all decisions issued by the Tribunal in which
one or more applicants successfully proved that they had experienced some form of discrimination contrary
to the Code from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2015.42 From this list, we created a database of all
general damages awards issued from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2015. We allocated one entry in the
database for each applicant. Thus, for cases with multiple applicants each receiving general damages
awards, we created separate entries for each general damages award received.43
be listening. On December 4, 2013, the Tribunal awarded a total of $71,000 in general damages and $27,592 in lost
income to three applicants who it found were subject to racial and religious discrimination.”) The $71,000 in general
damages was the total amount awarded to three applicants who received awards of $37,000, $22,000 and $12,000,
respectively in Islam v. Big Inc, 2013 HRTO 2009 at para 302.
41
Dijana Simonovic, “Update on Human Rights Tribunal Remedies 2012-2013” (Paper delivered at the OBA Annual
Human Rights Update, 17 June 2013), [unpublished]; Dijana Simonovic, “Update on Human Rights Remedial
Awards Rendered by Tribunals and the Civil Courts of Ontario in 2013-2014” (Paper delivered at the OBA Annual
Update on Human Rights, 23 May 2014), [unpublished].
42
We are grateful for the assistance provided by the Human Rights Legal Support Centre and the Human Rights
Tribunal of Ontario in collecting final decisions. We also relied on final decisions compiled by Simonovic in her
articles cited in note 42, supra, as well as by Dana Achtemichuk in her article “Losing the Public Interest: Remedies
Issued under Ontario’s Direct Access Model” (Anti-Discrimination Intensive Program, Osgoode Hall Law School,
April 2014) [unpublished, on file with the authors]. We checked the data drawn from these sources against our own
review of every HRTO ruling included in the CanLII database from 2000 to 2015.
43
Notably, cumulatively large awards issued in Islam v Big Inc, 2013 HRTO 2009, and OPT v Presteve Foods, 2015
HRTO 675, were split into multiple entries. In Islam, $71,000 in general damages was awarded cumulatively; we split
this into three entries corresponding to the individual general damage amounts awarded to each of the three
applicants: $12,000 for Mr. Islam, $22,000 for Mr. Hossain, and $37,000 for Mr. Malik. In Presteve Foods, a
cumulative general damage award of $200,000 was split into two entries corresponding to the amounts awarded to the
two applicants: $50,000 for the claimant identified as M.P.T., and $150,000 for the claimant identified as O.P.T. In

10

We included entries for all applicants who successfully proved that they experienced discrimination even
when the applicant did not actually receive a general damages award. These were included as awards of
zero dollars. These cases fell into three general categories:


rulings where discrimination was found against the respondent, but the Tribunal found that the
evidence did not establish a violation of dignity, feelings or self-respect.44



rulings where discrimination was found against the respondent, but the applicant did not request, and
was not awarded, a remedy of general damages. We included these rulings because they involve
exercises of the Tribunal’s remedial discretion. The Tribunal has awarded remedies, including
general damages, even when not requested by applicants.45 One of the reasons for this practice is
that self-represented applicants in particular may not be aware of the full range of the Tribunal’s
remedial authority.



rulings where discrimination was found against the respondent, but a law was found to be the cause
of the discrimination. The Tribunal is bound by court precedents that preclude the availability of
damages for these kinds of cases absent proof of serious government wrongdoing.46 These cases did
not involve the exercise of discretionary damage assessment by the Tribunal. Nevertheless, they
were instances of successful applicants receiving no compensation for dignitary harm, a situation
that the legislature could alter with a Code amendment, and for this reason we included them in the
database.

Of the 464 general damages awards in our database, 26 were awards of zero dollars. We explore the impact
of our decision to include these “0” damage awards in our analysis below, at page 19.

For clarity, we note that the following rulings were excluded from the database:
one case involving several applicants receiving general damage awards, we did not split the awards issued to multiple
applicants into separate entries. In Gilbert v. 2093132 Ontario, 2011 HRTO 672, a claim involving six applicants
regarding a single discriminatory comment, general damages of $600 were awarded corresponding to $100 for each
applicant. This was included as a single entry because the injury to dignity that each applicant experienced stemmed
from a single comment made by the respondent to all of the applicants as a group.
44
For example, McLarry v Universal Supply Group, 2011 HRTO 893 at para 52.
45
See, for example, Vallee v. Fairweather Ltd, 2012 HRTO 325 at para 26.
46
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 SCR 405. In
Mackin, the Supreme Court held that when governments are found to have breached the Charter through the
application of a law, damages will be unavailable unless the applicant can show governmental action that is “clearly
wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power” (at para 78). In Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et droits de
la jeunesse) v. Communauté Urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30, [2004] 1 SCR 489 (Quebec v. CUM), the Court
applied the Mackin rule to the award of damages against government for breach of human rights statutes resulting
from a law. The Ontario Divisional Court has said that Mackin and Quebec v. CUM have the effect of precluding the
award of damages for violations of the Ontario Code resulting from a discriminatory law: Ontario (Attorney General)
v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2007 CanLII 56481 (ON SCDC), 2007 CanLII 56481 (ON
S.C.D.C.) (Braithwaite). The HRTO is bound by these rulings and thus is precluded from awarding general damages
against government where the breach of the Code at issue flows from a law: see, e.g., Ball v. Ontario (Community and
Social Services), 2010 HRTO 360 at paras 168-171.
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rulings where no discrimination amounting to a breach of the Code was found;



rulings finding that a Code breach occurred, but it did not involve discrimination against the
applicant;47



rulings making awards for breach of settlement (since these awards are not general damages; that is,
they are not compensation for the dignitary harm of discrimination);



rulings on requests for reconsideration (none during this period altered the Tribunal’s original
general damages awards);



consent orders (since they do not involve the exercise of damage assessment discretion by the
Tribunal);



rulings which were overturned on judicial review on the finding of liability or the quantum of
general damages; in the former case, the HRTO ruling was removed from the database; in the latter
case, the award substituted by the final court ruling was included.

While some decisions regarding which cases to include in our database involved difficult judgment calls, we
believe the decisions we made are consistent with our aim to provide a complete and accurate picture of the
amounts of general damages awarded by the Tribunal to applicants who proved discrimination in violation
of the Code.

IV.

Results

The following figure is a scatter plot of general damages awards received from January 1, 2000 to
December 31, 2015 by applicants who succeeded in proving discrimination at the HRTO. Each blue square
represents the amount of an individual award (or awards) received by successful applicants for experiencing
discrimination. Awards were tracked by year issued, but not by month or day issued, which explains how
the awards are clustered across time.

Figure 1. General Damages Awards Received from 2000 to 2015

47

For example, Washington v. Student Federation of the University of Ottawa, 2010 HRTO 1976 at para 90.
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Immediately apparent from Figure 1 is the fact that the range of awards has remained relatively unchanged
from 2000 to 2015, apart from the $150,000 outlier in the top right corner, which represents the landmark
award issued in 2015 in Presteve Foods, a case that involved the egregious sexual exploitation of female
temporary migrant workers.48

Pinto’s conclusion that awards are “typically… in the range of $500 to $15,000” with awards of $25,000 to
$40,000 only “exceptional[ly]” being awarded in a few cases, appears to be true not only for the 2008-2012
period he surveyed, but also for awards issued from 2000 to 2015 as a whole.49 While 80% of the general
damages awards in our database are $15,000 or less (370 of 464), we should add that there are a significant
number of awards that exceed the typical range described by Pinto: 36 awards of $15,001-$20,000, 23
awards of$20,001-$25,000, 12 awards of $25,001-$30,000, 9 awards of $30,001-$35,000, 7 awards of
$35,001-$40,000 and 7 awards over $40,000. The Presteve Foods award of $150,000 to one of the

48
49

Presteve Foods, supra note 44.
Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 72.
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applicants in that case thus far stands apart as an outlier rather than an indication of an upward trend in
general damages at the HRTO. The award in Presteve Foods was not referenced in any other HRTO rulings
in 2015, and the only court ruling we are aware of to mention it distinguished it on the grounds that it spoke
to the appropriate amount of general damages only in cases of “sexual exploitation”.50

Figure 2 below shows, with blue square symbols, all awards except the $150,000 outlier from Presteve
Foods. We created this graph in order to make the spread of awards more visible. The average award per
year, in solid black squares, is also included.

Figure 2. General Damages Awards Received from 2000 to 2015, excluding the $150,000 award issued in
OPT v Presteve Foods

50

Strudwick v. Applied Consumer & Clinical Evaluations Inc, 2015 ONSC 3408 at para 28. The award of general
damages issued by the trial judge in Strudwick was doubled on appeal: Strudwick v Applied Consumer & Clinical Inc,
2016 ONCA 520. While the Court of Appeal in Strudwick did not mention the awards in Presteve, its ruling is a
similar example of a willingness to issue increased general damages awards in cases involving severe forms of
discrimination. See the discussion accompanying notes 98-100, infra.
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From Figure 2, it is apparent that while the range of awards from 2000 to 2015 has remained relatively
unchanged, a greater proportion of smaller awards were issued from 2008 to 2015. Changes in the
proportion of awards are explored in more detail in Table 2, and are discussed later in this paper.

Table 1, below, provides numerical data on the yearly average, median, and range of awards received by
successful applicants from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2015. Also shown is the number of applicants
each year who succeeded in proving that they experienced discrimination.

Table 1. Numerical data on general damages awards from 2000 to 2015

51

Year

Average Median

Range51

2000

10,188

6,500

2,000 – 41,000

# of applicants who
proved discrimination
8

2001

9,778

10,000

2,500 – 25,000

9

2002

14,938

10,000

3,500 – 40,000

8

2003

14,417

10,000

2,000 – 45,000

12

2004

16,000

17,000

5,000 – 25,000

4

2005

15,750

10,000

5,000 – 35,000

8

2006

22,063

21,500

10,000 – 35,000

8

2007

15,000

13,000

0/5,000 – 45,000

17

2008

10,923

10,000

0/1,000 – 30,000

13

2009

8,837

5,000

200 – 50,000

49

2010

8,814

8,000

0/100 – 35,000

75

2011

10,033

9,000

0/600 – 40,000

48

2012

9,504

10,000

0/1,000 – 40,000

52

2013

11,264

10,000

0/100 – 37,000

59

2014

13,198

10,000

0/600 – 45,000

51

2015

13,279

8,000

0/500 – 150,000

43

Total

11,216

10,000

0/100 – 150,000

464

Where the lowest award in a year was 0, the second lowest award above 0 is also shown.
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We then plotted a graph of the average general damages award issued in each year from 2000 to 2015,
shown below in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Average General Damages Award Received Per Year

Figure 3 demonstrates how the average annual general damages award changed over time. We discern from
Figure 3 four distinct periods:

I.

an increase in average awards from 2000 to 2006;

II.

a sharp decrease in average awards from 2007 to 2009;

III.

a stagnation of average awards from 2010 to 2012; and

IV.

an increase in average awards from 2013 to 2015.

In the first period, from 2000 to 2006, the average general damages award increased steadily, peaking at
over $20,000 in 2006, an increase of more than $10,000 from 2000. During this period, and indeed through
to the end of 2008, as Table 1 reveals, relatively few cases reached the Tribunal for final decision compared
to the situation beginning in 2009, when applications filed directly with the Tribunal under the new model
16

started to produce a larger number of final decisions. The cases that did reach the Tribunal under the old
model were carried forward by the Commission, which aimed to allocate its litigation resources to the cases
that raised the most important issues from the point of view of the public interest. In all cases that reached
the Tribunal under the old system, expert Commission counsel appeared to make submissions regarding
Code violations and remedies, and in some cases applicants also had their own counsel or representative.

The most striking aspect of Figure 3 may be what occurred in the second period: the steep drop in average
awards from 2007 to 2009, a drop of over $10,000. This period corresponds to the period of transition from
the old Commission-centred model of adjudication to the direct access model. Bill 107 was enacted in
December 2006 and the legislative changes it introduced came into effect on June 30, 2008. The Tribunal’s
approach to general damages assessment did not change substantively from the old to the new regime, and
the Tribunal and its membership were strengthened by the Code amendments.52 Although it is impossible to
know for certain what explains the downward trend in general damages awards from 2007-2009, we believe
the most likely explanation is the significant change in the volume and nature of the cases that reached the
Tribunal under the new direct access model. As mentioned, under the pre-2008 Commission-based model,
the Commission decided which cases would come forward to the Tribunal for a final hearing, and it would
prioritize cases that engaged systemic issues or otherwise had potentially broad impacts on matters of public
concern. After June 30, 2008, all applicants – even those whose cases raised relatively minor issues, like a
single discriminatory comment endured at work – had a right to a hearing before the Tribunal. Under the old
model, the Commission on occasion did bring forward cases that received general damages awards at the
low end of the scale: for example, in 2003, 4 of the 12 (or 33%) cases brought to the Tribunal received an
award less than $5,000. Nevertheless, Figures 1 and 2 above, as well as Table 2 below, make clear that
under the direct access model a greater proportion of cases received awards within the $0 to $10,000 range.

Table 2. Proportion of awards per period: 2000-2015

Period
(20002006)
Proportion of award type per
total awards in the period
% $0 awards53
0%

52
53

I Period II Period III Period IV
(2007-2009) (2010-2012) (2013-2015)

3%

9%

6%

Code, supra note 1, Part IV.
See pages 10-11, supra, for an explanation of which decisions we classified as resulting in awards of $0.
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% >$0 to $1,000 awards

0%

6%

7%

7%

% >$1,000 to $5,000 awards

28%

39%

25%

24%

% >$5, 000 to $10,000 awards

26%

18%

26%

22%

% >$10,000 to $20,000
awards

19%

23%

27%

27%

%>$20,000 and over awards

26%

11%

6%

15%

57

79

175

153

Total number of awards per period

In our database for the entire 2000-2015 period, we included information for each award on whether
applicants’ claims were brought forward by the Commission (which of course was always the case under
the old regime), and, under the new regime, whether applicants were represented by Centre counsel, private
counsel or were self-represented. We then calculated the average amount of general damages awarded in
each situation. The results are summarized below in Table 3. We include them here because they may help
shed some light on the changes in average awards during the four periods that emerge from a study of
Figure 3.

Table 3. Average Damage Awards 2000-2015 According to Nature of Representation

Counsel
Commission counsel

Number of General Average Amount
Damages Awards
Damages Award
110
$14,041

Centre counsel

72

$13,965

Private counsel or rep

124

$12,508

Self-represented

148

$7,116

No counsel indicated

10

$4,980

Total

464

$11,216

of

General

We can speculate about potential causes of the variation observed above. First, one might expect that those
represented by expert Commission counsel under the old model, or represented by expert Centre counsel or
private counsel under the new model, would tend to receive higher awards than self-represented applicants
because of the quality of representation provided. However, it is important to note that the Tribunal is
acutely sensitive to the challenges faced by self-represented litigants who make up a large proportion of
18

applicants under the new system. Indeed, our data reveals that under the new system, self-represented
litigants have made up 43% of the applicants who have succeeded in demonstrating a finding of
discrimination before the Tribunal. 54 The Tribunal makes extensive efforts to support self-represented
applicants through ‘active adjudication’, including by considering remedies that applicants have not
requested in their submissions. These efforts may reduce the impact the quality of advocacy might
otherwise have on the size of general damages awards.

Another reason for the variation between awards received by those with different forms of representation
could be the fact that Commission counsel, Centre counsel, and private counsel tend to select clients that
have experienced more serious Code breaches. The Commission under the pre-2008 model could choose to
take forward to a hearing only the most significant unsettled cases. Similarly, the Centre in the post-2008
model allocates its finite resources at least in part by reference to the difficulty and significance of the issues
raised. Moreover, private counsel will be retained by applicants typically in cases where more is at stake that is, where instances of discrimination with severe or widespread consequences are alleged. A higher
proportion of cases involving self-represented litigants are therefore likely to involve less serious allegations
of discrimination. For this reason, in our view the data in Table 3 may support the argument that the post2008 situation – where self-represented litigants are free to carry their cases to the Tribunal on their own,
regardless of the severity of the incident of discrimination – has had a significant impact on the average size
of general damages awards. In particular, it could explain the sharp drop in the average size of general
damages awards that accompanied the legislative changes.

To explore whether our decision to include certain awards of zero general damages was contributing to the
trend in average awards observed above, we removed awards of zero dollars and re-calculated average
award values. We then went further, removing all awards under $1,000, to explore what impact very lowaward cases could be having on the average award trend line. The results are shown in Figure 4 below.

54

If we remove from the data presented in Table 3 the cases carried by the Commission and the cases where no
counsel was indicated in the reported case, we are left with 148 damages awards made to self-represented litigants out
of a total of 344, or 43% of the total. The Pinto Report similarly found “that 44% of applicants who were successful in
their cases before the Tribunal were self-represented”: supra note 2 at 102. As the Report noted, this number, like
ours, “provides some corroboration that the Tribunal system is not as impossible to use for self-represented applicants
as critics claim; and that the Centre’s decision to decline representation does not necessarily impair applicants from
proceeding before the Tribunal.”
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Figure 4: Average general damages awards received per year -- comparing results obtained from excluding
awards of $0 and awards under $1,000

Thus, even when removing “awards” of $0 and awards under $1,000, the general trend observed in Figure 3
remains relatively intact. What appeared to be a stagnation in award values from 2010 to 2012 was due to an
increase in awards of zero general damages being issued by the Tribunal in this period.

The changes we have found in the average annual value of general damages awards need to be understood
in the context of the transformation in the scale of the Tribunal’s adjudicative role produced by the 2008
legislative reforms. Once the Commission’s gatekeeper role was removed, and all applicants could file their
claims directly with the Tribunal, the volume and range of applications reaching the Tribunal increased
dramatically. As a result, beginning in 2009, the number of general damages awards issued annually by the
Tribunal also increased dramatically, as illustrated by Figure 5 below. Over the 2000-2008 period as a
whole, the Tribunal issued on average of 9.7 general damages awards annually. From 2009-2015, the
average number of awards issued annually was 54, a six fold increase over 2000-2008.
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Figure 5: Number of general damages awards issued annually by the HRTO, 2000-2015

Figure 6 below depicts the dramatic increase in the total dollar value of all general damages awards made by
the Tribunal each year from 2000 to 2015. We see a major and sustained increase following the coming into
force of the 2008 amendments, with a high of over $673,000 in 2014. We found that the average annual
total amount of general damages awards issued by the Tribunal from 2000 to 2008 was $136,167; from
2009 to 2015 it was $568,360, a four-fold increase under the new regime.
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Figure 6: Total monetary value of all general damages awards issued by the HRTO by year from 20002015

Inflation has eroded the real value of awards

We adjusted our data to take into account the effect of inflation so we could depict changes in the real value
of general damages awards over time. This was done by assigning the year 2000 as the “base year”, and
multiplying each award by a ratio of the Ontario consumer price index (“CPI”) in the year 2000, over the
Ontario CPI of the year in which the award was issued.

Figure 7, below, shows an overlay of all inflation-adjusted awards (in red “x” marks) over all non-adjusted
awards (in blue squares) issued between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2015. In this way, awards are
depicted in nominal and real terms. The red “x” marks represent awards in ‘year 2000 dollars’; that is,
awards that were adjusted for inflation. The blue squares represent award values as issued to the applicant;
that is, the nominal value of the awards when they were issued.
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Figure 7. General Damages Awards Received from 2000 to 2015, in nominal terms and in “year 2000
dollars”

In Figure 8, below, we have removed the $150,000 award from Presteve Foods from this graph to make it
easier to see the spread of the remaining awards.
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Figure 8. General Damages Awards Received from 2000 to 2015, in nominal terms and in “year 2000
dollars”, excepting the $150,000 award issued in OPT v. Presteve Foods
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Figure 9, below, includes two trend lines illustrating changes in the average general damages award, per
year, in nominal terms (blue squares) and in inflation-adjusted terms (red “x” marks), over time.

Figure 9. Average general damages awards per year, from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2015

Figures 7-9 demonstrate how inflation has caused a reduction in the real value of nominal awards, opening
up an increasingly large gap between the size of real and nominal awards in the period under study. Since
the nominal range of general damages awards has remained relatively unchanged from 2000 to 2015,55
when inflation is taken into account, the real range has decreased. This demonstrates the importance of
indexing awards to keep pace with inflation’s eroding impact on the real value of general damages awards.

We then removed awards under $1,000, calculated average awards based on this new data set, and adjusted
the average award data for inflation. The results are shown in Figure 10 below:

55

See figures 1 and 2, supra.
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Figure 10: Average general damages awards per year – comparing results obtained from excluding awards
under $1,000

Table 4. Data on general damages awards from 2000 to 2015

Year

2000

Average award, Average
Median award, Range,
in
in nominal terms award, in in “year 2000 “year 2000
“year 2000 dollars”
dollars”
dollars”
2,000
–
10,188

10,188

6,500

41,000
2,426

2001
9,778

9,488

9,704

24,260
3,329

2002
14,938

14,206

9,510

–

–

38,040
26

1,852

2003
14,417

13,350

9,260

41,670
4,546

2004
16,000

14,547

15,456

15,750

14,011

8,896

22,063

19,284

18,793

15,000

12,875

11,158

–

38,624
0/839

2008

–

30,593
0/4,292

2007

–

31,137
8,741

2006

–

22,729
4,448

2005

–

–

10,923

9,168

8,394

25,181

2009

8,837

7,391

4,182

167 – 41,821

2010

8,814

7,195

6,530

0/82 – 28,571
0/475

2011
10,033

7,945

7,127

2013

31,674
0/781

2012

–

–

9,504

7,420

7,808

31,232

11,264

8,709

7,732

0/77 – 28,607
0/455

2014
13,198

10,017

7,590

34,154
0/373

2015
13,279

9,912

5,972

–

–

111,970

Awards in cases involving termination of employment based on pregnancy

Because the nature of the issues raised in applications that are the subject of final decisions by the Tribunal
varies over time - especially with the move from a Commission-centred model to a direct access model in
2008 - we reviewed our database to determine whether there were any recurring scenarios with similar facts
that came before the Tribunal over the period of our study. By isolating a recurring and factually similar
group of cases, we can shed further light on trends in the assessment of general damages by the Tribunal.
We decided to select cases involving a form of sex discrimination that recurs with distressing frequency:
27

employers terminating female employees shortly after finding out they are pregnant. We isolated all of the
cases in our database – 27 in total56 – where the applicant established that her employment was terminated
at least in part on the basis of pregnancy. The scatter chart below depicts the pattern of awards in these cases
of employment termination based on pregnancy, in nominal and real terms.

Figure 11. General Damages Awards in Pregnancy/Employment Termination Cases from 2002 to 2015, in
nominal terms and in “year 2000 dollars”

56

Chacko v. Transpharm Canada Inc., 2002 CanLII 46514; Dodds v. 2008573 Inc. (Sharks Sports Pub), 2007 HRTO
17; Maciel v. Fashion Coiffures, 2009 HRTO 1804; Gonneau v. Denninger, 2010 HRTO 425; Guay v 1481979
Ontario, 2010 HRTO 1563; Osvald v Videocomm Technologies, 2010 HRTO 770; Charbonneau v Atelier Salon &
Spa, 2010 HRTO 1736; Splane v Ultimate Fitness, 2011 HRTO 195; Bickell v The Country Grill, 2011 HRTO 1333;
Graham v 3022366 Canada Inc., 2011 HRTO 1470; Chowdury v 2023628 Ontario Inc. o/a Quizno's Sub, 2012
HRTO 1892; Ong v. Poya Organics & Spa Ltd., 2012 HRTO 2058; Tekyi-Annan v. 2191214 Ontario Inc., 2013
HRTO 1947; Peart v. Distinct HealthCare Services Inc., 2013 HRTO 305; Korkola v. Maid Day! Maid Day! Inc.,
2013 HRTO 525; McKenna v. Local Heroes Stittsville, 2013 HRTO 1117; Shinozaki v. Hotlomi Spa, 2013 HRTO
1027; Huang v High Life Heating, Air Conditioning & Security Inc., 2014 HRTO 1356; Lugonia v Arista Homes,
2014 HRTO 1531; Golovaneva v Atkinson Schroeter Design Group Inc., 2015 HRTO 1471; Angeles Toledo v
Mexitaco, 2015 HRTO 1464; Richards v 905950 Ontario Ltd o/a Storybook Childcare Centre, 2015 HRTO 517;
Lougheed v Little Buddies Preschool Centre, 2015 HRTO 909; Watters v Creative Minds Childrens Services LTO
Daycare, 2015 HRTO 475; Marne v Aptco Capital Corporation, 2015 HRTO 588; Despres v The Crossbar Inc., 2015
HRTO 1624; Wratten v 2347656 Ontario Ltd., 2015 HRTO 1041.
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In the first pregnancy/employment termination case in our database, Chacko (2002), the Tribunal assessed
general damages at $5,000. The second award, Dodds (2007), was for $15,000. The Graham case, decided
in 2011, set a new high of $20,000.

Depending on factors such as the length of employment, the presence or absence of discriminatory actions
in addition to the termination, the conduct of the respondent, any contributing responsibility of the
applicant, and especially the strength of the evidence of the financial and emotional impact of the
discriminatory termination on the applicant, the awards issued by the Tribunal range from $2,000 to
$10,000 on the low end (13 cases), $12,000 to $17,000 in the mid-range (11 cases) and $20,000 at the high
end (3 cases). While there are only two decisions that pre-dated the coming into force of the direct access
model, it is notable that most subsequent awards are in line with the range established by those first two
decisions.

The range of general damages awards in pregnancy/employment termination cases has remained more or
less constant over the course of the period under study. This is especially apparent when the impact of
inflation is taken into account. The Tribunal has established a new high end of the range by making awards
of $20,000 beginning in 2011. However, in real terms an award of $20,000 in 2015 is a modest increase
over the first award of $15,000 issued in 2007.

V. Discussion and Recommendations

Our data confirms the accuracy of Pinto’s observation that the range of awards during the 2008-2012 period
remained the same as under the pre-2008 system. Indeed, his observation holds true not only for the time
period he studied but also for the entire time period we have studied. From 2000 to 2015, 80% of general
damages awards have been granted in the range up to $15,000 identified as typical by Pinto. Awards of over
$15,000 to $40,000 accounted for another 19% of awards, and the remaining 3% of awards were $40,000 or
higher.57

Given that the range of general damages awards has remained roughly the same from 2000 to 2015, it
follows that, in real terms, inflation has caused this range to decrease over the 15 year period studied. We

57

See Figures 1 and 2, supra, pages 12-13; Table 2, supra, pages 16-17.
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have illustrated the magnitude of this decrease by adjusting the data for inflation and graphing the results in
Figures 7 and 8 above.58

In examining the average award over time, we observed that it has gone through several periods
characterized by upward trends (2000-2006 and 2010-2015), and a sharp decline at the time of transition to
the direct access system (2007-2009).59 In real terms, the average award dipped steeply below its year 2000
value in 2009, ultimately recovering to a level roughly equivalent to year 2000 levels in 2014.60 If awards
under $1,000 are excluded from the data, the average award, in real terms, returned to year 2000 levels in
2013.61

Is the current level of general damages too low? As discussed above, in November 2012 Pinto thought that
general damages awards were too low and recommended that they be significantly increased. We agree with
Pinto’s conclusion and recommendation for the following reasons.

First, failing to correct for inflation has resulted in applicants being awarded less than an individual would
have received in an earlier year for the same or substantially similar harm. This is a problem, because there
is no reason that applicants should receive less than others in similar cases simply because they experienced
discrimination later in time. Failing to correct for inflation ensures results that run directly counter to the
purpose underlying the conventional approach – the goal of ensuring that similar applicants receive similar
awards across time. It results in similar applicants receiving less over time. The courts take into account the
impact of inflation when assessing non-pecuniary damages in other areas of tort law, as we discuss in more
detail below. The Tribunal should do the same when assessing general damages for Code violations.

Second, even when correcting for inflation’s devaluing effect, in our view the nominal value of general
damages awards for discrimination under the Code is too low.

The special and important nature of equality rights must be kept in mind when evaluating the current
nominal value of general damages awards. In his 1982 opinion in Heerspink, Justice Lamer (as he then was)
commented that anti-discrimination laws are "fundamental", considered by the people to be, "save their

58

Supra, pages 22-25.
See Figure 9, supra, page 22.
60
See Figure 3, supra, page 15.
61
See Figure 10, supra, page 25.
59
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constitutional laws, more important than all others." 62 Since then, the Supreme Court has variously
described anti-discrimination statutes as "public and fundamental law of general application",63 as declaring
"public policy regarding matters of general concern",64 as being "of a special nature, not quite constitutional
but certainly more than ordinary",65 as incorporating "certain basic goals of our society",66 as "intended to
give rise, amongst other things, to individual rights of vital importance",67 and as "often the final refuge of
the disadvantaged and disenfranchised”.68 In recognition of its importance, the Code, like human rights
legislation in other Canadian jurisdictions, has what the Supreme Court of Canada has described as a
“special, quasi-constitutional status.”69

One consequence of the quasi-constitutional status of anti-discrimination statutes that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized is that their provisions must be given large, liberal and purposive interpretations
that best advance the goal of achieving substantive equality. 70 This obligation extends to remedial
provisions: the remedial powers of human rights tribunals must be interpreted and exercised in a broad and
flexible manner to ensure the attainment of their goals.71 Therefore, the general damages-granting provision
of the Human Rights Code should be interpreted liberally. This is particularly important given that the
general damages power is the only power that can be used to compensate for the injury to dignity caused by
discrimination. Injury to dignity is not a loss that is ancillary to the range of harms that are caused by
discrimination – rather, it lies at the core of what makes discrimination harmful. The importance of the
dignity interest is evident from the Code’s preamble, which discusses human dignity three times in the span
of two recital clauses.72 We must ask ourselves whether, in 2015, assessing the value of the injury to human
62

BC v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 SCR 145 at 158, 137 DLR (3d) 219.
Winnipeg School Division No I v. Craton, [1985] 2 SCR 150 at 156, 21 DLR (4th) 1
64
Ibid.
65
Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpsons Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 547, 23 DLR (4th) 321
(O’Malley).
66
Robichaud v. Canada, [1987] 2 SCR 84 at 90, 8 CHRR 4326 (Robichaud)
67
Canadian National Railway Co v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 SCR 1114 at 1134, 8 CHRR
4210 (Action Travail des Femmes).
68
Zurich Insurance Co v. Ontario, [1992] 2 SCR 321 at 339, 93 DLR (4th) 346.
69
Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc (Bombardier
Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 SCR 789 at para 30.
70
See, e.g., McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 2 SCR 108 at para 17; Canada
(Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471 at paras 33
and 62; British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU (Meiorin), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at
para 44; B v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2002] 3 SCR 403, 2002 SCC 66 at para 44; O’Malley, supra note
66 at 547.
71
Action Travail des Femmes, supra note 68; Robichaud, supra note 67.
72
Code, supra note 1, Preamble. We also note that the Supreme Court of Canada, in discussing the section 15 Charter
prohibition on discrimination, has repeatedly emphasized that the human dignity of every individual is an “essential
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dignity caused by discrimination at an average of $9,912 (in real terms) truly reflects the importance of
equality rights legislation.

It is true that the valuation of an appropriate monetary remedy for an injury to dignity is difficult, as the
injury itself cannot be measured in dollars. As is the case with awards for non-pecuniary loss in other areas
of tort law, assessing general damages is thus, to some extent, an unavoidably subjective task.73 To help
meet this challenge, we find it useful to compare general damages awards for human rights violations with
the size of non-pecuniary damages issued by courts for other tortious wrongs. The special status of the Code
suggests that general damages awards for its violation should be higher than non-pecuniary damages aimed
at compensating tortious wrongs that lack a constitutional or quasi-constitutional dimension. Yet, if we
compare human rights general damages to non-pecuniary damages issued in other tort actions, we find that
human rights damages are lower. For example, awards for general damages issued for injuries to reputation
in defamation cases cover a range from $25,000 to $500,000, a range significantly higher than the range of
general damages issued for Code violations.74 In a recent study of damage awards in defamation cases,
Hilary Young found that the average general damages award for harm to reputation and pain and suffering
in cases decided from 2003 to 2013 was $48,799, more than four times higher than the average general
damages award of $11,216 issued by the HRTO over the 2000-2015 period of our study.75 Reputational
damages in defamation cases provide a useful comparator, given that Justice Cory famously described
injury to a plaintiff’s reputation caused by defamation as being “closely related to the innate worthiness and
dignity of the individual”.76 The same is true of discrimination as recognized by s.15 of the Charter and
human rights legislation, laws that have superior normative significance in our legal system. In our view,
the range of general damages awards for the injury to “dignity, feelings and respect” for violations of the
Code should be at least comparable to awards for injury to dignity resulting from torts lacking constitutional
status. But if they remain at their current levels, as Pinto noted, they threaten to “send a message that human
rights and breaches of the Code are of limited importance”. 77
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Third, while the focus of general damages awards under human rights legislation is compensatory, not
punitive, inherent in any award is a deterrent effect. Tort damages awards have the twin goals of providing
compensation to plaintiffs and deterring future tortious behaviour by defendants and others. The HRTO
acknowledges the deterrence function of general damages awards when it states, as it frequently does, that
they should not be so low as to amount to a “licence fee” for discrimination. But we are concerned that the
costs of complying with the Code may frequently be higher than the amount of general damages awards
issued by the Tribunal. If general damages remain low, respondents may well decide that violating the Code
is cheaper than the costs of compliance.

Finally, the Tribunal must consider the impact of low general damages awards on access to justice for
persons who have experienced discrimination. Applicants are frequently members of vulnerable and
disadvantaged groups, who urgently need the benefit of the Code’s protections. The Code’s prohibitions are
aimed at ensuring women can work free from sexual harassment in employment, at protecting racialized
individuals from being discriminated against in securing housing, in ensuring those with disabilities can
access the same services that the general public is offered, among other protections. As Denise Réaume has
noted, “[t]he fact that employment, housing, and services are covered is not just a technical legal fact about
the scope of the legislation. These areas are covered because of their historical implication in social patterns
of inequality that have been deep and damaging as well as their ongoing importance in giving people a
modicum of control over the shape and quality of their lives.”78

The Code is intended to provide individuals with speedy access to remedies for discrimination issued by an
expert Tribunal at low cost. No fees are charged to applicants under the Code. The Tribunal’s rules do not
permit the award of legal costs against unsuccessful parties, so as not to deter applicants from seeking
remedies for discrimination. Nevertheless, the litigation process imposes a host of costs on parties,
including the time, stress and wages forgone that may result from filing applications, producing documents
and other evidence, and participating in mediation and in hearings before the Tribunal. Given the increasing
demand for the Centre’s services,79 many who require representation or other services may not be able to
access legal assistance free of charge. Applicants who are not represented by the Centre may find it
78
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necessary to hire counsel to navigate the litigation process effectively, and thus may incur substantial legal
costs. For those who need but cannot afford private counsel, low general damages awards impose a barrier
to accessing justice if the remedy is ultimately too small to justify pursuing a lengthy and stressful ordeal of
filing and pursuing a human rights application. 80 Most troubling, even though the 2008 amendments
abolished appeals from Tribunal rulings, and sought to insulate the Tribunal from judicial intervention by
adding a strong privative clause to the Code,81 applicants who are successful at the Tribunal are exposed to
the possibility of a costs award if the Divisional Court is persuaded that the Tribunal’s ruling was
unreasonable.

Three examples drawn from the case law during the period under study help illustrate the significance of
this problem. In Saadi v. Audmax, the applicant was successful at the Tribunal and received a general
damages award of $15,000.82 Her employer sought judicial review. The Divisional Court overturned the
Tribunal’s findings of liability and ordered Ms. Saadi to pay $10,000 in legal costs. 83 In Pieters, the
Tribunal’s findings of racial discrimination and awards of $2,000 in general damages to each of the two
applicants84 were overturned by the Divisional Court.85 While the Court of Appeal restored the Tribunal’s
findings and general damages awards,86 Mr. Pieters and Mr. Noble were burdened with a $20,000 costs
award issued by the Divisional Court. This costs award was five times higher than the total of the two
general damages awards the applicants received from the Tribunal. 87 In Nemati v. Ontario College of
Teachers, the applicant received $10,000 in general damages from the Tribunal after demonstrating
discrimination on the basis of her place of origin.88 Ms. Nemati sought judicial review in an attempt to
persuade the Divisional Court that the general damages awarded to her were inadequate. The Court upheld
the Tribunal’s award and ordered Ms. Nemati to pay the respondent $12,000 in legal costs.89

In light of the fundamental public policy rationale underlying the Code of promoting speedy and affordable
access to remedies for discrimination, we find it disturbing that costs awards on judicial review can so easily
80
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match or outstrip the general damages awards issued by the Tribunal. Are the harms of discrimination really
no greater than the costs of hiring a lawyer to defend an award on judicial review? Moreover, persons
considering filing applications with the Tribunal who receive responsible legal advice must be told that
while it costs them nothing to initiate an application to the Tribunal, if they are successful, the result could
be overturned on judicial review in which case they could be forced to bear a portion of the respondent’s
legal costs. The public policy in favour of ready access to the Tribunal has been undermined by a costs
regime more suitable to private litigation infiltrating the process at the judicial review stage. The result is a
deterrent impact on the filing of applications. And for those who choose to file applications, significant
pressure is placed on them to accept modest settlement offers rather than incur the risks of proceeding to a
hearing at the Tribunal.

In sum, low general damages awards cause a host of consequences that are detrimental to the achievement
of substantive equality in Ontario. Low awards relative to other tortious wrongs send a message that
breaches of the Code are of lesser importance, trivializing the value of these quasi-constitutional,
fundamental rights.90 Low awards risk creating insufficient incentives for employers, landlords and service
providers to undertake actions that advance a culture of compliance with the Code. Low awards jeopardize
access to justice at the Tribunal when they are outstripped by the costs and risks of litigation.91 For these
reasons, low general damages awards fail to achieve the Code’s purpose of recognizing the inherent dignity
and worth of all Ontarians.

Increasing General Damages Awards

In theory at least, increases in general damages awards could be encouraged by the three pillars of Ontario’s
human rights system – the Tribunal, the Centre and the Commission – or by the courts or the legislature. In
the discussion that follows we consider the possibilities of change being instigated by each of these
institutions.

The Courts

It appears unlikely that the Divisional Court would play a role in initiating change in judicial review of
general damages awards issued by the Tribunal. The Code gives the Tribunal broad discretion in the
90
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assessment of general damages for Code violations. The Divisional Court has described the damage
assessment process as resting “at the heart of the expertise of the Tribunal”.92 As a result, the standard of
review for Tribunal decisions on general damages awards is at the most deferential end of the spectrum of
reasonableness review. 93 When the Divisional Court has altered general damages awards issued by the
Tribunal, with the exception of one case 94 it has been to quash or reduce those awards.95

On the other hand, courts awarding general damages themselves, pursuant to s. 46.1 of the Code, appear to
be taking a modestly more expansive approach to assessing general damages.96 Section 46.1 of the Code
enables courts to issue general damages awards for violations of the Code if those violations accompany the
commission of other civil wrongs (like wrongful dismissal) that are the subject of the court proceeding. The
courts have more latitude in assessing general damages awards under s. 46.1 compared to the deferential
posture that is appropriate on judicial review of Tribunal rulings.

In the limited case law to date, the courts have taken the Tribunal’s lead in applying the same non-indexed
conventional approach to the assessment of general damages, but seem to have awarded slightly higher
general damages awards 97
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Two recent appeal court rulings encourage a more generous approach to general damages assessment that
goes beyond the conventional range established by human rights tribunals. In Strudwick v. Applied
Consumer & Clinical Evaluations Inc., 98 the Ontario Court of Appeal issued an award of $40,000 for
general damages for violation of the Code, double the amount issued by the trial judge, in a wrongful
dismissal case involving discrimination on the basis of disability. Justice Epstein reviewed the range of
compensation awarded by the Tribunal in similar cases, and noted that past awards “should be by no means
determinative of the ultimate award” and “that there should be no cap on damages arising from the violation
of an individual’s human rights.”99 In light of the “particular severe” effects of the discrimination against
Ms. Strudwick, she concluded that “the circumstances here require damages in excess of those awarded in
[previous HRTO] cases.”100

The Strudwick opinion indicates that tribunals and courts should not be hesitant to issue awards that exceed
the conventional range where circumstances warrant. The same message emerges from the British Columbia
Court of Appeal decision in University of British Columbia v. Kelly101 that restored an award of $75,000 in
general damages issued by the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal. The B.C. Supreme Court had characterized the
general damage award as “patently unreasonable” because it was “more than double the previous high of
$35,000 for similar discrimination”.102 In a unanimous ruling, the Court of Appeal disagreed. Just as Justice
Epstein observed regarding the Ontario Code in Strudwick, Justice Donald in Kelly noted that there is no cap
on injury to dignity awards under the B.C. Code.103 Moreover, he stated that the Tribunal is not bound by
the conventional range of awards established in previous cases. “Ranges established by previous cases”, he
noted, “play a more diminished role in the Tribunal’s determination of an award for injury to dignity.”104 It
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is not unreasonable, he held, for a Tribunal to exceed the conventional range.105 It is for the Tribunal, he
said, to measure appropriate compensation based on all of the evidence, not the reviewing judge.106

The Ontario Legislature

In our view it would be inadvisable for the legislature to consider amendments to the Code that would alter
the broad remedial discretion currently granted to the Tribunal. The discretion to tailor appropriate remedies
should remain with the Tribunal as the specialized body with the requisite expertise to administer Ontario’s
human rights system with sensitivity to the specific facts of each case as well as the broader patterns of
disadvantage that produce discrimination.

Nevertheless, we would suggest four amendments to the Code that we believe are worth considering and
that would not interfere with the Tribunal’s remedial discretion. One would be to amend the Code to
provide that general damages can be awarded against the government when discrimination flows from a
statute, regulation or a by-law. The Tribunal is currently bound by court decisions that preclude general
damages awards in these circumstances absent government action that is “clearly wrong, in bad faith or an
abuse of power.”107 This rule, originally adopted in the context of Charter claims, is intended to relieve
legislative bodies from concerns about incurring tortious liability when exercising law-making
responsibilities. While this is an important consideration, it should not lead in our view to a rule that in
practice amounts to a blanket immunity. A better approach would be to amend the Code to permit the
Tribunal to exercise its discretion to award general damages against governments for discrimination caused
by laws, and directing the Tribunal to consider the burden on law-making bodies when doing so. In this
way, the goal of compensating individuals for injury to “dignity, feelings and self-respect” could be
appropriately balanced against the need to not unduly burden law-making bodies.

Second, the legislature should consider an amendment to restrict the award of costs by the courts when
respondents found liable in Tribunal decisions are successful on judicial review. Such an amendment would
remove a significant form of financial jeopardy that applicants to the Tribunal currently face. It might also
lead respondents to pause before initiating judicial review applications, a consequence that would be
consistent with the legislature’s adoption of a strong privative clause stating that Tribunal decisions are
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“final and not subject to appeal and shall not be altered or set aside in an application for judicial review or in
any other proceeding unless the decision is patently unreasonable.”108

Third, the legislature should consider restoring the Tribunal’s power to award damages, in addition to
general damages, where the respondent has willfully or recklessly violated the Code. While the legislature
apparently intended to increase damages awards when Bill 107 repealed the provision of the Code that
allowed the Tribunal to make awards in these circumstances of up to $10,000 for “mental anguish”, the
result appears to have been the opposite. Moreover, recent awards issued by the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal, which can consist of two prongs pursuant to s.53 of the Canadian Human Rights Act – one as
compensation for “pain and suffering”, and another as “special compensation” for wilful or reckless
violations109 – have tended to be greater in combination than the single awards for general damages issued
by the HRTO.110 The two-pronged approach may encourage the Tribunal to focus not just on compensation,
but also in a more sustained way on the need to fashion awards with sufficient deterrent impact (especially
for reckless or repeat violators of the Code) to create a culture of human rights compliance.

The Human Rights Legal Support Centre

Counsel from the Centre assisting individuals with applications before the Tribunal (and private counsel for
applicants) could adopt a range of different practices aimed at increasing general damages awards. First,
counsel making submissions before the Tribunal could advocate directly for the Tribunal to adopt
indexation practices. It may be useful for the Centre to adopt an institutional policy or practice of promoting
indexing, such as a policy of consistently referring to not only the nominal value of general damages awards
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granted in previous cases, but also the indexed value when making submissions during settlement
negotiations, mediation, or adjudication.

Second, and separate from the issue of inflation, counsel may want to consider some of the practices
recently exhibited by lawyers in labour arbitration cases. As Lisa Feinberg has described, 111 labour
arbitrators are increasingly awarding higher general damages amounts for Human Rights Code breaches,112
and these awards are being granted in cases where counsel are adopting practices rarely seen at the
Tribunal.113 Feinberg identified three notable practices that may have played a role in persuading arbitrators
to award higher amounts. First, union counsel are referring directly to the Pinto Report’s recommendation
on general damages.114 Second, union counsel are requesting awards in the six-figure plus range. In three
notable labour cases reviewed by Feinberg, counsel requested amounts ranging from $75,000 to over $3.5
million.115 In these cases, the arbitrators granted awards ranging from $25,000 to $98,000 – amounts which,
while still being significantly lower than the amounts requested, are notable for being generally higher than
awards typically seen at the Tribunal.116 Finally, rather than requesting a single lump sum award for the
respondent’s breach of the Code, union counsel are breaking down their request for general damages into
separate amounts for each Code breach found.117 For example, in Hamilton (City) v Amalgamated Transit
Union, Local 107, a case alleging sexual harassment of a transit inspector by her supervisor in the Hamilton
public transit service, union counsel broke down the request for general damages into separate awards for
each instance of a Code violation: $10,000 for unwanted touching, $10,000 for the receipt of pornographic
emails, $15,000 for public humiliation as a result of the offensive comments and gestures made, $20,000 for
the City’s failure to investigate, and $20,000 for reprisal. 118 In this case, the arbitrator noted that the
Tribunal does not generally award separate general damages amounts for each Code breach in one
application, but awarded a total general damages award of $25,000, “bearing in mind the ATU’s distinct
111
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claims for specific violations on AB’s behalf.”119 While the Tribunal typically awards a single general
damages award even in cases involving multiple discriminatory incidents, issuing separate awards for each
incident would fall within the Tribunal’s broad remedial discretion pursuant to s.45.2 of the Code.

In addition, counsel may wish to consider citing case law from other areas of law, such as non-pecuniary
damages issued in tort law. Non-pecuniary tort damages awards made by the courts are for pain and
suffering, lost enjoyment of life and lost expectation of life caused by the tort (or for harm to reputation and
pain and suffering in the defamation context), concepts that are not equivalent to the injury caused by
discrimination to “dignity, feelings and self-respect”. But where there is overlap or a close affinity between
discriminatory wrongs and common law wrongs, non-pecuniary damages awards should provide useful
reference points for the Tribunal. For example, non-pecuniary damages awards made by courts in sexual
harassment tort cases may provide useful comparators for the Tribunal in fashioning general damages
remedies for claims involving sexual harassment.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission

The Ontario Human Rights Commission could assist in increasing general damages awards in several ways.
First, the Commission could advocate for the indexation of awards in its submissions to the Tribunal, either
while acting as an intervenor in s. 34 applications or when it is bringing an application in the public interest
pursuant to s. 35 of the Code. Second, the Commission could conduct research into the state of general
damages awards in Ontario and other jurisdictions as part of its “duty to protect the public interest” and “to
promote the elimination of discriminatory practices.120 Drawing on this research, and as part of its mandate
to engage in public legal education121 and to promote and advance respect for human rights in Ontario,122
the Commission could advocate for indexation or other strategies aimed at ensuring general damages
awards issued by the Tribunal are adequate.

The Commission could also consider developing and approving a policy on general damages assessment, or
on the Tribunal’s remedial practices more generally, pursuant to its authority to craft and approve policies
“to provide guidance on the application of Parts I and II” of the Code. 123 The Code provides that the
119
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Tribunal is bound to consider Commission policies if parties or interveners raise them during proceedings at
the Tribunal.124 If the Commission was a party or an intervenor in an application at the Tribunal and the
Commission believes that the Tribunal made a decision or order that was inconsistent with a Commission
policy, the Commission can require the Tribunal to “state a case” to the Divisional Court relating to that
decision.125

However, we have doubts about whether the Commission has the authority to develop and approve a policy
on general damages assessment. Section 30 of the Code provides that the Commission can develop and
approve policies relating to Parts I and II of the Code, the Parts that set out prohibitions on discrimination
and address their interpretation and application. 126 However, the Tribunal’s power to award general
damages is located elsewhere in the Code. Part IV establishes the Tribunal and gives it broad powers to
determine its procedures and practices, including remedial practices, for the resolution of applications. 127
In other words, while the Code recognizes that the Commission has expertise in interpreting the scope and
applicability of the Code’s prohibitions on discrimination, it has designated the Tribunal, not the
Commission, as the expert in determining what procedures and practices will best ensure a “fair, just and
expeditious” resolution of applications.128 Thus, it is likely that if the Commission were to craft a policy on
general damages assessment, it would be exceeding the scope of its authority and encroaching on the
authority of the Tribunal.

The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal

As noted above, the Tribunal has frequently acknowledged in principle the importance of taking inflation
into account when assessing general damages.129 However, the Tribunal has never explicitly taken inflation
into account in the assessment of general damages in a particular case. In our view, the Tribunal needs to
adopt a consistent practice of indexing general damages awards to account for inflation’s devaluing effect
on the nominal size of awards over time.

Persuasive precedent exists in other areas of the law for adopting such a practice. In 1978 the Supreme
Court of Canada imposed a $100,000 cap on non-pecuniary damage awards in common law personal injury
124
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actions and noted that these awards should be “viewed flexibly in recognition of… changing economic
conditions”.130 Four years later, the Court affirmed that the cap should be indexed to account for inflation.131
Courts now routinely adjust the $100,000 cap on non-pecuniary damages in personal injury actions. For
example, in Knight v. Knight, counsel agreed that the cap had risen to $350,000 by 2014 when adjusted for
inflation.132

Courts have also adopted indexation mechanisms for statutory non-pecuniary awards. For example, courts
have indexed awards issued under s. 61(2)(e) of the Ontario Family Law Act for the loss of “guidance, care
and companionship” when a family member is negligently injured or killed.133 The Ontario Court of Appeal
has described these relational losses as “immeasurable” and “incalculable”.134 In Fiddler v Chiavetti, the
Court adjusted the range of s.61(1)(e) damages as follows:
In February 1992, (the month of the To accident) the consumer price index for Canada
was at 83.3. In January 2005, the month of the deceased’s death, the consumer price
index was at 105.3. Given that increase in the consumer price index, therefore, the
damages in January 2005 equivalent to $100,000 in February 1992 are roughly $125,000.
That is, it would take approximately $125,000 in January 2005 dollars to purchase the
same basket of goods purchased for $100,000 in 1992. I therefore find that the upper end
of the acceptable range of damages in this case would be limited to approximately
$125,000.135
What approach could the Tribunal take to indexing general damages awards to account for inflation? We
suggest that the Tribunal adopt a rule pursuant to s. 43(1) of the Code, which grants the Tribunal the power
to “make rules governing practice or procedure before it”.136 The rule could stipulate that when the Tribunal
considers the size of general damages awards in previous rulings interpreting the Code, or when parties
make submissions on the size of general damages awards in previous rulings, the amount will be described
by referring to both the nominal size of the award at the time of the ruling and the current size of the award
after having accounted for inflation.

The Tribunal could consider adopting a practice direction to counsel directing them to use a certain specific
inflation calculator – for example, the Tribunal could create one which could be accessible through the
130

Andrews, supra note 34 at 263.
Lindal v Lindal, [1981] 2 SCR 629, 129 DLR (3d) 263 at 640-641.
132
Knight (Litigation guardian of) v Knight, 2014 BCSC 1478, [2014] BCJ No 2034 at para 82. See also Sorochan,
supra note 35.
133
Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 61(2)(e).
134
To v Toronto Board of Education, 204 DLR (4th) 704, 2001 CanLII 11304 at paras 21-30 (Ont CA).
135
Fiddler v. Chiavetti, 2010 ONCA 210, 317 DLR (4th) 385 at para80,.
136
Code, supra note 1, s 43(1).
131

43

Tribunal’s website, or it could refer counsel to the Bank of Canada’s online inflation calculator.137 However,
the Bank of Canada’s calculator uses the national consumer price index, and the Tribunal may prefer to craft
their own using the Ontario index as we have done in our calculations, as that approach would more
accurately ensure that Ontario residents are receiving the same value of awards as Ontario residents have in
previous years.

Implementation of the above-described practice could occur in the following manner. Take as an example
the following paragraph from Richards,138 one of many we could have selected that typifies the Tribunal’s
non-indexed conventional approach to general damages assessment. We have altered it in a manner that
would reflect how it might look if the Tribunal adopted the rule we have just proposed, with our alterations
highlighted in bold text:

The applicant requests that the Tribunal award her $15,000 dollars in general damages. In
reviewing decisions of the Tribunal where pregnancy was either a factor or the sole reason
to terminate employment, I note that to date, awards for injury to dignity, feelings and
self-respect have generally ranged between $10,000.00 and $20,000.00. See for example:
Bickell v. The Country Grill, 2011 HRTO 1333 (CanLII)($15,000.00N; $15,874R),
Graham v 3022366 Canada Ltd., 2011 HRTO 1470 (CanLII) ($20,000.00N; $21,165R),
Maciel v. Fashion Coiffures, 2009 HRTO 1804 (CanLII) ($15,000.00N; $16,618R)...
Purres v. London Athletic Club (South) Inc., 2012 HRTO 1758 (CanLII) ($10,000.00N;
$10,435R).139
The Tribunal issued a general damages award of $10,000 in Richards.140 In light of the above adjustments,
the Tribunal chose an award that had a real value below the low end of the range of cases it cited. To fulfill
the Tribunal’s desire for consistent awards in similar cases in real terms, a more appropriate award would
have been $10,435.

We believe the case for indexing general damages awards is unimpeachable. It better fulfills the Tribunal’s
desire for consistency that drives its adherence to a conventional approach. But in our view, indexing is not
enough. Indexing simply prevents the low value of general damages awards from sinking even lower
through the eroding effects of inflation. If one accepts that the range of general damages awards needs to be
significantly increased, as the Pinto Report and we have argued, the Tribunal needs to be willing to step
beyond the conventional range of awards. The unprecedented $150,000 general damages award issued by
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Vice-Chair Mark Hart in Presteve Foods141 provides an encouraging example. In a careful and thoroughly
reasoned opinion, he explained why the circumstances of that case required such an unusually large award.
Tribunal members should be able to present similarly careful reasoning to justify awards that go beyond the
conventional range in other cases, including cases that involve common scenarios, like terminations of
employment based in part on the applicant’s disability or pregnancy.

It is true of course that increasing the range of general damages awards will initially come at some cost to
the virtues of consistency and predictability that have driven the Tribunal’s adherence to a conventional
approach.

But while consistency and predictability are important values, allowing them to have a

determining impact on damage assessment will have the effect of preventing Pinto’s recommendation from
ever being implemented. One might also argue that Tribunal members who are bold enough to issue awards
beyond the conventional range will be doing applicants no favours, as those awards will be vulnerable to
being altered on judicial review. This is indeed a real risk in light of the one-sided direction of the
Divisional Court’s interventions with Tribunal general damages awards on judicial review.142 But this risk
can be minimized if Tribunal members carefully and persuasively make the case for departing from the
conventional range. Damage assessment, as the courts have repeatedly emphasized, lies at the heart of the
Tribunal’s expertise. As the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized in Strudwick,143 and the B.C. Court of
Appeal recognized in Kelly,144 it cannot be the case that the only reasonable exercise of the Tribunal’s
remedial discretion is to continue to adhere to the same conventional range of general damages awards.

Conclusion

Our analysis of general damages awards issued by the HRTO has revealed that, consistent with the findings
of the Pinto Report, the range of general damages awards has remained more or less constant in nominal
terms over the entire 2000-2015 period. We have also found that, in real terms, the range of general
damages awards has decreased. Compared to the size of non-pecuniary damages awards made by the courts
in other areas of tort law, such as defamation, HRTO general damages awards have been modest in size
throughout the period under study, notwithstanding the quasi-constitutional status of the rights protected by
the Code. We have argued that the Pinto Report was right to urge the Tribunal to reconsider its approach to
141
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general damages and significantly increase the monetary range of these awards. While the average size of
general damages awards has followed an upward trend from 2010 onwards, the increase has been modest,
especially in real terms. The Tribunal has not altered its non-indexed conventional approach to general
damages assessment, and until it does, the significant change recommended by Pinto will not be realized.
The non-indexed conventional approach will continue to produce a stable pattern of nominal awards whose
real value is steadily eroded by the Tribunal’s failure to account for the impact of inflation.

We have suggested a number of steps that could be taken by the Tribunal to redress the situation. An easily
adopted reform, consistent with precedent in other areas of tort law, would be for the Tribunal to
systematically adjust the size of past awards for inflation to ensure that its conventional approach to general
damages assessment does not lead to the steady erosion of the real value of awards.

Indexation is a necessary but insufficient step. We have argued that the Tribunal needs to move beyond its
conventional approach to the assessment of general damages in order to accomplish meaningful
compensation and deterrence. Awards should reflect the quasi-constitutional status of the rights protected by
the Code. They should also be sufficient to ensure that litigants receive compensation that surpasses the
costs and risks associated with the Code application process, including the danger of costs being awarded
against applicants on judicial review. To ensure meaningful deterrence of human rights violations, the
Tribunal often makes the point in its rulings that it must avoid issuing awards that are so modest as to
amount to nothing more than a “licence fee” for discrimination. Yet our data reveals that 181 of the 464
general damages awards issued by the Tribunal from 2000 to 2015 (or 39%) were for amounts of $5,000 or
less. In our view, the Tribunal’s actual general damages assessments do not conform to its own guiding
principles.

While our study has focused on HRTO general damages assessments, and has led us to critical conclusions,
our focus should not detract from the signal accomplishments of the Tribunal since the direct access model
came into force in 2008. As Andrew Pinto noted in his report, under the new system “a greater volume of
cases are resolved faster without a backlog developing and, for those cases that do not settle and proceed to
a hearing, they are decided much faster.”145 Our data reveals that after 2008, the Tribunal is issuing general
damages awards at a rate six times higher than it did prior to the reforms, and the total amount of general
damages issued annually by the Tribunal is on average four times greater than was the case under the old
system. The significant drop in the average value of general damages awards after the 2008 changes is to a
145

Pinto Report, supra note 2 at 43.

46

large extent explained by the much higher volume of cases reaching the Tribunal, cases that raise a broader
range of discrimination issues, from relatively minor “single incident” infringements of the Code to more
serious systemic issues.

Moreover, we have no reason to believe that other Canadian human rights tribunals have a better record
than the HRTO when it comes to awarding non-pecuniary damages as compensation for the experience of
discrimination. The woefully thin body of case law issuing damages for breaches of Charter rights and
freedoms hardly provides inspiration to statutory tribunals.146 While we have not undertaken a systematic
study of general damages awards issued by other Canadian human rights tribunals, we do note that in the
past year both the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal and the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal have issued
awards that on average are higher than the norm in Ontario. For example, in 2015, the average size of the
CHRT’s three final rulings ordering general damages was $30,000.147 The average size of the 20 awards
issued by the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal in 2015 for injury to “dignity, feelings and self-respect” was
$16,452, over $3,000 higher than the average award in Ontario in 2015.148

In terms of the volume and quality of jurisprudence produced nationally on anti-discrimination law since
2008, the work of the HRTO is unmatched. However, in our view the Tribunal’s record in assessing general
damages does not live up to the promise of its impressive body of work on liability issues. Since the
adoption of a comprehensive Code and the establishment of the Commission in 1961, both firsts of their
kind in the country, Ontario “has long served as a model for other human rights systems in Canada”.149 Just
as it has in protecting human rights in other ways in the past, we would like to see Ontario take the lead in
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its approach to general damages awards. We hope that the analysis and recommendations in this paper
might help point the way forward.
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